The single European Act, provided to the European Parliament its first real legislative powers, powers that seem to have been enlarged in each treaty since, while its ability to monitor and control the executive, though embedded in the treaty of Rome, seems to have been increased in a similar way. But is this apparent extension of power really profitable to the European Parliament ? And were the treaties the main means for MEPs to gain power? Before the Single European Act, the European parliament was no more than a consultative organ of the European community. Even if it took this consultative role seriously and made extensive use of it, it had the same power as that of a lobby group. Even after being directly elected, it kept the name of the European Assembly.
[...] Journal of Common Market Studies 41/2: special issue David Coombes The future of the European Parliament. London : Policy Studies Institute. John A Usher the European community institutions and legislation; Longman Kasack, Legislative Impact if the European Parliament under the Revised Codecision Procedure -Environmental Public Health and Consumer Protection Policies”. European Union politics Earnshaw and D judge: early days the European parliament, co decision and the European union legislative process post Maastricht, Journal of European Public Policy,2 S. Hix, A. [...]
[...] Indeed, they threw out the common position of the council after the failure of the conciliation committee. The Parliament's power of veto is very effective contrary to what Tsebelis and Garett thought. This example showed that the equality between Council and Parliament have been reached because the first can no longer carry out its common position if conciliation failed But the main criticism made about their point of view is that it is ignoring the informal aspect of inter institutional bargaining process, their argument is purely theoretical and ignore a lot of empirical fact, whereas the “informal dimension of inter-institutional relations are of major significance in understanding policy making in the and “informal inter institutional linkage have expanded as a result of co decision”[6]. [...]
[...] A tendency that will continue with the Treaty of Lisbon[2]. This procedure appears to give to the EU a legislative system close to those of the French or of the English one, with one Chamber directly elected and another indirectly elected, consecutive institutional reforms are moving the EU towards a genuinely Bicameral system”.[3] Discussion about the advantage of the co operation procedure has erupted among scholars. The reasoning of Tsebelis and Garett is articulated following two points: first, the role of the commission is weakened. [...]
[...] This confirmed the power of EP in the formation of the Commission. If the EP demonstrated a real control and role in supervising and appointing the commission, its role concerning the other two main executive bodies, the Council of European Union and the European Council, is slight or negligible and no treaty really changed that since the SEA. The only rights that the parliament has is, for the Council of European Union, those of receiving the president of the council(four times a year) or some of its ministers and ask them question. [...]
[...] The procedure is similar in the case of the parliament and the council agree on the text at the first reading but if the parliament reject it at the second reading by an absolute majority a conciliation committee is called. This conciliation committee is composed of both members of the EP and the council and tries to produced a joint text, if a joint text is not produced the act is abandoned, if a joint text is produced, it is discussed in the EP and the council. If no agreement is reached on the joint text, then the draft is abandoned. [...]
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